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Abstract
Despite common perception, existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for-
mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportional-
ity and platform polarization. In this paper, we build a model that incorporates the
disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard Downsian electoral com-
petition setup with mainly, but not necessarily purely, policy-motivated parties.
We first show that in equilibrium, platform polarization is decreasing in the level
of the electoral rule disproportionality. We then argue that the number of parties
has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by
the distance between the two most distant platforms. This effect does not hold
when polarization is measured by the widely used Dalton index. Constructing a
dataset covering more than 300 elections, our main theoretical findings are empir-
ically supported, pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major
determinant of polarization.
Keywords: proportional representation; disproportional electoral systems; po-
larization; policy-motivated parties; number of parties; Duvergerian predictions
Replication materials can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OX5CZF.
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Party-system polarization has a significant effect on a wide array of policy issues, rang-
ing from the political stability (Sartori 1976) and cabinet survival (Warwick 1994) to the
effectiveness of policy making (Tsebelis 2002) and political representation (Abney, Mor-
rison, and Stradiotto 2007; Huber and Powell 1994). Additionally, polarization may have
a strong negative effect on economic performance and growth (Frye 2002) and increase
the risk of social tension and violent conflict within and between nation states (Esteban
and Schneider 2008). Among several alternative theories proposed, one can attribute po-
larization to a wide range of forces spanning from informational or media-related factors
(e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Grosser and Palfrey 2013) to candidates’ differing
policy preferences (e.g., Calvert 1985; Roemer 1994).
In this paper, we focus on one institutional and one structural determinant of polar-
ization and ask the following questions: How does the electoral rule disproportionality
determine the polarization of a party-system when parties are mainly, but not necessarily
purely, policy motivated?1 How does the nature of political competition and the number
of competing parties affect polarization? Finally, does empirical evidence support the
predictions of the theory?
In light of contradicting empirical results regarding the effect of the electoral rule
disproportionality on platform polarization (e.g., Andrews and Money 2009; Budge and
McDonald 2006; Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Curini and Hino 2012; Dalton 2008; Dow 2011,
2001; Ezrow 2008), the development of robust theoretical predictions becomes extremely
relevant. In the first part of this paper, we do precisely this: We incorporate the electoral
rule disproportionality in a Downsian setup and develop two distinct theoretical predic-
tions. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in which the degree of platform
polarization is a) decreasing in the level of electoral rule disproportionality, independently
of how polarization is measured, and b) increasing in the number of competing parties
1In the main text, we present our results considering only policy-motivated parties.
In the online appendix, we show that our results are robust to partially office-motivated
parties.
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when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms
(MDP). If, instead, polarization is measured by the extensively used Dalton index (DI),
we argue that the effect of the number of competing parties on platform polarization is
nontrivial. In the second part of the paper, we provide empirical evidence in support of
these theoretical findings.
The relationship between electoral rules and platform polarization has previously been
explored. In his seminal work Cox (1990) analyzed a model with purely office-motivated
parties and argued in favor of a negative link between the disproportionality of the elec-
toral rule and platform polarization. More recently, Calvo and Hellwig (2011) applied
an alternative approach based on a probabilistic voting model (a la` Adams, Merrill, and
Grofman 2005), which also led to formal arguments in favor of the negative relation-
ship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization. Using a
citizen-candidate model, Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) show that certain equilibria of
a proportional system lead to larger polarization than certain equilibria of plurality rule
elections.
We believe that the features of an equilibrium of a formal model can better support an
empirically testable hypothesis if this equilibrium meets three criteria: a) the equilibrium
is proven to exist, b) it is essentially unique, and c) it relies on standard assumptions
regarding the interests of all participating agents (both parties and voters). To our
knowledge, the present formal analysis is the first to combine all three of these features.
Cox (1990) stresses that his “results only tell what will happen if there is an equilib-
rium; they do not guarantee that an equilibrium will exist.” In contrast, the approach
taken by Calvo and Hellwig (2011) neatly guarantees equilibrium existence. Nevertheless,
this is achieved by introducing a non-conventional assumption on voters’ preferences: Vot-
ers not only care about parties’ proposed platforms, but also care about the asymmetry
between a party’s seat and vote share. Finally, given the nature of the citizen-candidate
model employed, Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) cannot provide straightforward compar-
isons across electoral systems due to the well-known problem of multiplicity of equilibria
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(for further discussion see Dhillon and Lockwood 2002).
Our work overcomes the complexities of establishing the existence of an equilibrium in
a framework with standard voters’ preferences by introducing policy-motivated parties (a
la` Calvert 1985; Wittman 1977). Given the unique equilibrium prediction obtained, we are
able to explore and empirically test the link between the electoral rule disproportionality
and platform polarization. The way we overcome the problems of possible non-existence
of equilibria is not novel in the literature. Groseclose (2001), for example, used this
framework to deal with the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria in a competition
between two office-motivated candidates of unequal valence.
A common link between our paper and the aforementioned literature (Calvo and
Hellwig 2011; Cox 1990; Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2013) is the analysis of a continuum
of disproportionalities. In essence, our analysis considers any rule that lies between
a purely proportional and a winner-takes-all electoral rule. This continuum not only
allows the analysis of different electoral systems in an abstract way but also permits the
comparison of different electoral rules that may belong in the same family despite varying
disproportionality. For example, considering proportional representation (PR) systems,
Italy’s electoral rule is much more disproportional compared to the Netherlands’.2
In order to fully grasp why electoral disproportionality acts as a centripetal force,
thereby resulting in low levels of polarization, we first model a two-party election. Let
2For important pairwise comparisons between first past the post (FPTP) and pro-
portional systems, see Austen-Smith (2000); Becher (2014); Funk and Gathmann (2013);
Iversen and Soskice (2006); Lizzeri and Persico (2001) on redistribution, Morelli (2004)
on party formation, and Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) on corruption. For a pair-
wise comparison between plurality and runoff elections, see Osborne and Slivinski (1996).
Myerson (1993a,b) offer pairwise comparisons between PR, approval voting, FPTP, and
the Borda rule, focusing on the issues of corruption and campaign promises. A recent
series of papers by Dellis and Oak (2015, 2007); Dellis (2013) also focuses on interesting
pairwise comparisons.
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the leftist party have its preferred policy somewhere to the left of the ideal policy of the
median voter while the rightist party has its preferred policy somewhere to the right of
the ideal policy of the median voter. First, parties announce their platforms. Second,
voters observe the announced platforms and vote for the party that proposed the platform
closest to their ideal policy. A policy is then implemented according to the parliamentary-
mean model (De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2007; Llavador 2006; Merrill and Adams 2007;
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın 1997).3 In such a model, the implemented policy is a weighted average of
parties’ announced platforms where parties’ weights are determined by their parliamen-
tary power. The parliamentary-mean model therefore represents a model of consensual
democracies (Lijphart 1984). The level of inclusiveness of the policy setting process will
clearly depend on the disproportionality of the electoral system. As common in these
models, parties choose to differentiate in equilibrium, and this heterogeneous behavior is
obtained without needing to assume that parties are uncertain about voters’ preferences.
This is in contrast to other important contributions with policy-motivated parties (e.g.,
Calvert 1985; Groseclose 2001; Wittman 1977) where the presence of such uncertainty is
3We borrow the model’s name from Merrill and Adams (2007) who compare it to the
dominant-party model where each party implements its proposed platform with probabil-
ity equal to its vote (or seat) share (Merrill and Adams 2007; Faravelli and Sanchez-Pages
2014; Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2013). We will further interpret our results through the
dominant-party model at a later stage.
For two-party compromise models under PR elections, see Llavador (2006); Ortun˜o-
Ort´ın (1997). For multi-party models, see De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007, 2008);
Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın (1998); Merrill and Adams (2007). An alternative to assum-
ing such policy compromise in PR elections would involve the analysis of post-electoral
bargaining and coalition formations (Austen-Smith 2000; Austen-Smith and Banks 1988;
Baron and Diermeier 2001; Baron, Diermeier, and Fong 2012; Cho 2014; Indridason 2011).
Although the interest of such models is indisputable, their applicability in a comparative
analysis of different electoral is problematic.
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crucial.
Our theoretical results identify disproportional electoral rules as a major centripetal
force. The intuition behind this is clear. On one hand, as a party moves towards the
center, it increases its vote share and, hence, its weight in the implemented policy. On the
other hand, when the leftist (rightist) party becomes too moderate in comparison to its
opponent, the implemented policy might end up too far to the right (left), if the extra seat
share gained from this moderation is relatively small. As the disproportionality of the
electoral system increases, proposing a moderate platform may be worthwhile since the
incentives to obtain some extra votes are amplified. In highly disproportional systems, a
small advantage in votes is translated into a large advantage in parliamentary seats, and
hence, into a large asymmetry between the weights of the two parties in the implemented
policy. This result generates the first empirically testable hypothesis of our model: An
increase in the electoral rule disproportionality decreases platform polarization.
We conduct the same analysis introducing a third party.4 We show that in equilibrium
platform polarization measured by the MDP moves in the same direction as in the two-
party election (higher electoral rule disproportionality leads to less platform polarization).
Moreover, ceteris paribus and under an MDP measure, a larger number of competing
parties increases platform polarization. On the other hand, our analysis shows that the
Dalton index (DI) does not provide a global prediction regarding the effect of the number
4In order to keep our analysis to a reasonable length, we do not allow the number of
parties to depend on the electoral rule disproportionality. In the working paper version of
our work (Matakos et al. 2013), we nevertheless consider a variation of this model with
an endogenous number of parties that includes an entry stage in the game. We show
that in line with the Duvergerian predictions (Duverger 1954), the number of competing
parties is decreasing in the level of electoral rule disproportionality. Our results, therefore,
point at a second indirect channel through which disproportionality affects polarization:
As the number of parties decreases in the level of electoral rule disproportionality, the
centripetal forces of disproportionality are further amplified.
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of parties on the degree of platform polarization.
Our empirical analysis departs from recent research in terms of the estimation method-
ology and survey design in the following aspects. First, by combining three data sources
(Comparative Political Data Set I, Comparative Manifesto Project, and Carey and Hix
2011), we construct a balanced panel of 23 advanced democracies (OECD states) with
a large number of electoral observations over a 50-year period. This totals more than
300 observations. Second, our study simultaneously considers a) both continuous and
categorical measures of the electoral rule (dis)proportionality, b) two different measures
of platform polarization (the MDP and the DI as detailed above), and c) random and
fixed effects estimators. Our empirical findings provide strong support in favor of our
main theoretical prediction: The level of platform polarization is decreasing in the level
of electoral disproportionality. Furthermore, as our theory predicts, the number of com-
peting parties has a significant positive impact on platform polarization when the latter
is measured by the MDP.
The Model
We construct a formal model in line with the parliamentary-mean model (e.g., Casamatta
and De Donder 2005; De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2007; Llavador 2006; Merrill and
Adams 2007; Ortun˜o-Ort´ın 1997). In contrast with past models, our model allows the
implemented policy to not only depend on parties’ vote shares and proposed platforms,
but also on the disproportionality of the electoral system. We first consider a two-party
election (j = L,R) where parties strategically announce their platforms. Voters observe
these platforms and vote for one of the two parties. Given parties’ vote shares (VL and
VR), the announced platforms (pL and pR), and the (dis)proportionality of the electoral
system (n), a policy pˆ is implemented.
The policy space is assumed to be continuous, one-dimensional, and represented by
the interval Π = [0, 1]. There is a unit mass of voters whose ideal policies are distributed
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across the policy space according to a continuous and twice-differentiable probability
measure F on Π with median m (i.e., F (m) = 1
2
). Let pii ∈ Π denote the ideal policy
of individual i. We assume that each voter cares about the remoteness (but not the
direction) of the proposed platform pj from his ideal policy pii. Formally, a voter i with
ideal policy pii votes for party j if |pj−pii| < |p−j−pii| and votes for either of the two parties
with equal probability if he is indifferent between the two (i.e. when |pj−pii| = |p−j−pii|).
We denote as p¯i the ideal policy of the indifferent voter. That is, p¯i is the ideal policy
of the voter for whom it holds that |pL − p¯i| = |pR − p¯i|. Given that preferences are
symmetric, the location of the indifferent voter is always halfway between the platforms
proposed by the two parties. Formally, p¯i = (pL + pR)/2, and, therefore, parties’ vote
shares are given by
VL(pL, pR) =

F (p¯i) = F (pL+pR
2
), if pL < pR
1
2
, if pL = pR
1− F (p¯i) = 1− F (pL+pR
2
), if pL > pR
and
VR(pL, pR) = 1− VL(pL, pR).
Parties are policy motivated. Their payoffs depend on the implemented policy rather
than on an exogenously given office value for winning the election.5 Each party j has an
ideal policy pij ∈ Π and piL < m < piR. Party j’s payoffs when policy pˆ is implemented
are given by Uj(pˆ) = v(|pˆ − pij|), where v : [0, 1] → R is any twice differentiable strictly
decreasing function.
The implemented policy is a function of parties’ parliamentary power and parties’
proposed platforms (pL, pR). Parties’ seat shares (SL, SR) are a function of parties’ vote
shares (VL, VR) and the disproportionality of the electoral system denoted by n. We
5In the online appendix, we relax this assumption by allowing parties to be partially
office motivated, and we show that our main predictions remain unaffected.
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formally define the implemented policy function as the following:
pˆ(pL, pR, n) = SL(pL, pR, n)× pL + SR(pL, pR, n)× pR
This function captures the post-electoral compromise between parties’ platforms depend-
ing on parties’ parliamentary power. Parties’ vote shares are translated into parlia-
mentary seat shares depending on the electoral rule disproportionality n following Theil
(1969):6
SL
SR
=
(
VL
VR
)n
When n = 1, the above formula captures a purely proportional representation system.
Letting n = 3 the allocation of seats follows the famous “cube law”, which is considered a
good approximation of the distortions created in favor of the winner in FPTP elections.
In general, as n increases, the electoral system more disproportionately favors the winner
of the election. In order to apply the term disproportionality as it is conventionally
understood – that is, in favor of the winner – we assume throughout the paper that
n > 1.
Since we know that SL + SR = 1 and that SL/SR = (VL/VR)
n, we can rewrite the
seat shares as follows: SL = V
n
L /(V
n
L + V
n
R ) and SR = V
n
R /(V
n
L + V
n
R ). Therefore, the
implemented policy function can be rewritten:
pˆ(pL, pR, n) =
VL(pL, pR)
n
VL(pL, pR)n + VR(pL, pR)n
pL +
VR(pL, pR)
n
VL(pL, pR)n + VR(pL, pR)n
pR
6Taagepera (1986) offers a further analysis of the above formula, as well as empirical
estimations of parameter n. For an overview of measures of bias and the proportionality
in the relationship between vote shares and seat shares, see Grofman (1983). Gallagher
(1991) provides an analysis of indices and empirical measures of disproportionality. For
recent applications of this formula, see Calvo and Hellwig (2011); Ergun (2013); King
(1990).
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Figure 1: The weight of a party’s proposal (i.e., its seat share) as a function of its vote
share for the cases where n = 1, n = 3, and n→∞.
In existing models of pure proportional representation (e.g., Llavador 2006; Merrill
and Adams 2007; Ortun˜o-Ort´ın 1997), the associated weights on parties’ platforms are
assumed to be proportional to parties’ vote shares (i.e., n = 1). As depicted in Figure
1, by allowing n to take values larger than one, we increase the weight put on the policy
proposed by the winner of the election, for a given electoral outcome. This is true since
assuming that n > 1 the weight function is convex for values smaller than one-half
and concave for values larger than one-half. If n → ∞, then parties actually compete
in a winner-takes-all election where the implemented policy converges to the winner’s
proposed platform.
Notice that the weights determined through this specific functional form are identi-
cal to the seminal contest success function introduced by Tullock (1980, pp. 97-112).
Recently, the application of this type of contest success function to the analysis of elec-
toral systems has gained popularity. The work by Saporiti (2014) also analyzes electoral
competition but in contrast to ours, only considers the two-party scenario and does not
provide a general result for the two-party equilibrium. Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari
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(2014) and Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey (2014) focus on an another important aspect of
democracies, namely turnout under alternative electoral rules.
As in most spatial models of this type, individuals vote for one of the parties once
they observe the announced platforms. As a result, parties strategically announce their
platforms, thereby determining voters’ behavior, the outcome of the game, and the cor-
responding payoffs. With parties being the actual players of the game the equilibrium
concept we apply is Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Uniformly distributed voters
For clarity of presentation, we first analyze the case of uniformly distributed voters.
Before providing the equilibrium characterization, let us illustrate through an appropriate
example how a disproportional electoral rule may provide centripetal forces.
Consider first the pure PR system (where n = 1) depicted in Figure 2a. Let parties
propose platforms at the extremes of the policy space (pL = 0 and pR = 1) and assume
that the ideal policy of the leftist party is piL = 0.3. The voter who is located at one-half
is indifferent between the two proposed platforms (p¯i = 0.5). Voters to the left of the
indifferent voter support the platform of the leftist party, while voters to the right of the
indifferent voter support the rightist party. Given that voters are uniformly distributed,
each party obtains 50% of the votes. Combining this vote share with the proportional
system (n = 1), each party’s platform has an equal (50%) weight on the implemented
policy. Hence, the implemented policy is one-half (which coincides with both the median
and the ideal policy of the indifferent voter).
Let us explore the consequences of a deviation of the leftist party to a more moderate
platform in such a proportional system (Figure 2b); let, for example, party L deviate
from pL = 0 to pL = 0.2. Now, the indifferent voter moves further to the right (p¯i = 0.6).
Hence, party L obtains 60% of the votes, while party R obtains 40% of the votes. Party L
has a larger weight than before for the determination of the implemented policy (now 60%
12
Figure 2: Centripetal incentives.
compared to 50%), but at the same time proposes a more moderate platform (pL = 0.2
compared to pL = 0). Therefore, the implemented policy is pˆ = 0.52. Since the ideal
policy of party L is to the left of the ideal policy of the median voter, party L has no
incentive to deviate from its initial strategy: By doing so, the implemented policy moves
farther away from its ideal policy.
Consider now a more disproportional electoral system (let, for example, n = 3), as
depicted in Figure 2c. As before, if party L announces platform 0.2 rather than zero, it
obtains 60% of the vote share. Because of the disproportionality, this vote share translates
to a disproportionally high weight of 77% on its proposed platform. In contrast to the case
when n = 1, this weight now compensates the loss from proposing a moderate platform.
In this case, the implemented policy is 0.38. Hence, party L has an incentive to deviate
from its initial strategy: By doing so, the implemented policy comes closer to its ideal
policy.
The general mechanism providing centripetal forces as the degree of disproportion-
ality of the electoral rule increases is clear. The following proposition enhances our un-
derstanding of the quantitative relationship between platform polarization and electoral
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rule disproportionality beyond simply its direction.
Proposition 1. Let pii ∼ U [0, 1]. Then, (i) There exists a unique equilibrium (p∗∗L , p∗∗R ) =
(1
2
− 1
2n
, 1
2
+ 1
2n
), (ii) the distance between p∗∗R and p
∗∗
L is decreasing in n, and (iii) pˆ =
p¯i = 0.5.
The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of two-party elections (p∗∗L , p
∗∗
R ) for
different values of electoral disproportionality n ∈ [1, 20] is depicted in Figure 3. If n = 1
(i.e., no distortions are present), parties propose platforms at the extremes of the policy
space (p∗∗L = 0 and p
∗∗
R = 1). It is easy to calculate that the unique equilibrium when n = 3
is (p∗∗L , p
∗∗
R ) = (1/3, 2/3). In the extreme case of a winner-takes-all election (n → ∞),
where the winning party can implement its platform, parties asymptotically converge to
the median. Notice that the equilibrium characterization does not depend on parties’
ideal positions but solely on the disproportionality of the electoral rule.
The General Result
While our results so far provided a clear intuition of our model’s dynamics and how
polarization in equilibrium is affected by different levels of disproportionality, we are now
generalizing this result for a large family of voters’ distributions. Notice that here we
allow the society to be more inclined towards the left or the right of the policy space
since we do not require the distribution to be symmetric. For purely technical reasons,
we assume that piL = 0 and piR = 1. This extra assumption gives our game a strictly
competitive nature that allows us to consider a very broad family of distributions of
voters’ ideal policies. Furthermore, as we argue after the statement of the proposition, the
assumption of extreme parties may trivially be relaxed in the vast majority of admissible
cases.
Proposition 2. Let F be such that F (x)n/[F (x)n+(1−F (x))n] is a log-concave function.
Then, (i) there exists a unique equilibrium (p∗L(n), p
∗
R(n)) where p
∗
L(n) < p
∗
R(n), (ii) if,
given some n0, we have that 0 < p
∗
L(n0) < p
∗
R(n0) < 1, then pˆ(n0) = p¯i(n0) = m,
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p∗R(n0)− p∗L(n0) = 1/[n0f(m)], and for every n1 and n2 such that n0 < n1 < n2, we have
|p∗L(n1) − p∗R(n1)| > |p∗L(n2) − p∗R(n2)|, (iii) p∗L(n) → p∗R(n) when n → ∞, and (iv) if
m = 0.5, then p∗L(n) = 1− p∗R(n) for every n ≥ 1.
For any degree of disproportionality, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. The leftist party proposes a policy to the left of the median voter, and the
rightist party proposes a policy to the right of the median voter. In an interior equilib-
rium (i.e., 0 < p∗L(n) < p
∗
R(n) < 1), the implemented policy coincides with the median
voter’s ideal point, while both parties propose platforms that diverge from the median
by the same distance. Most relevant to our purposes, as the disproportionality of the
electoral system increases, parties have incentives to propose more moderate platforms.
Asymptotic convergence to the median is predicted in the case of winner-takes-all elec-
tions (n → ∞). The intuition behind parties’ incentives to moderate their platforms is
similar to the case of uniformly distributed voters.
Despite our analysis possibly allowing an asymmetric distribution of voters’ ideal
points, parties propose platforms that are symmetric with respect to the median. That
is, even when the distribution is skewed towards the left or towards the right, parties may
locate symmetrically around the median. The asymmetry in terms of the distribution is
reflected in parties’ payoffs; the closer the ideal policy of a party to the median voter’s
ideal policy, the larger the party’s payoffs.
Another case of asymmetry that our model can accommodate is when parties are
non-extreme (i.e., 0 < piL < m < piR < 1). Consider first two extreme parties (i.e.,
piL = 0 and piR = 1) and some F and n such that the unique equilibrium is interior (i.e.
0 < p∗L(n) < p
∗
R(n) < 1). The above proposition dictates that in such an equilibrium
the implemented policy coincides with the ideal policy of the median voter. That is,
when party L chooses p∗L(n), the implemented policy is guaranteed never to be to the
right of the ideal policy of the median voter for any pR ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, p∗R(n) would
not be R’s best response to L choosing p∗L(n). This suggests that when party L chooses
p∗L(n), the unique best response of party R is p
∗
R(n) even if R was non-extreme (i.e. for
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any piR ∈ (m, 1]). Similarly, when party R chooses p∗R(n), the unique best response of
party L is p∗L(n) even if L is non-extreme (i.e., for any piL ∈ [0,m)). Hence, the interior
equilibrium platforms p∗L(n) and p
∗
R(n) are independent of the exact locations of parties’
ideal policies.
So, why do we make the assumption of parties’ extreme preferences in the first place?
This assumption makes our game strictly competitive, and, hence it provides our re-
sults a broad appeal since it allows us to take into account the rare cases of non-interior
equilibria. The empirically relevant implication of the above formal result (the negative
relationship between electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization), though,
is straightforwardly independent of such concerns. Hence, it is robust to parties having
non-extreme policy preferences. This reassuring observation, along with the fact that the
log-concavity condition is satisfied by a large family of distributions, guarantee that our
work provides a broad picture of two-party elections under different degrees of dispropor-
tionality.7
Notice that our general result fully backs up the recent empirical results of Curini
and Hino (2012) regarding the effect of the number of independent voters on platform
polarization. The equilibrium condition, p∗R(n0) − p∗L(n0) = 1/[n0f(m)], clearly shows
that polarization (p∗R(n0)− p∗L(n0)) is decreasing in the density of moderate voters, who
can be considered a proxy of the share of independent voters in the electorate (Curini
and Hino 2012; Green 2007; Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999).
The Three Parties Case
We now consider a three-party electoral race (a leftist, a centrist, and a rightist party). It
is straightforward that the complexity of the analysis increases several orders in magnitude
when we increase the cardinality of the set of players from two to three (e.g., Adams and
7For example, the log-concavity condition is satisfied when voters’ ideal policies are
distributed according to any unimodal Beta distribution (that is, pii ∼ Beta(α, β) with
α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1).
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Merrill 2006). For example, the game is no longer strictly competitive as when only
two parties compete. Therefore, the equilibrium characterization cannot follow from a
standard combination of the popular properties that strictly competitive games have
(see proof of Proposition 2). Hence, to guarantee tractability, we must make further
assumptions. First, we assume that the ideal policy of the centrist party is at one-half
(that is, piC = 0.5), and the leftist and the rightist parties are extreme (piL = 0 and
piR = 1). Second, we consider an equilibrium in this case to be a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium such that the distribution of policy proposals is symmetric around the center
of the policy space. Since three parties now compete in the election, each party’s seat
share is given by the following expression (Theil 1969; Taagepera 1986):
SJ =
V nJ
V nL + V
n
C + V
n
R
Therefore, the implemented policy function for the three-party model is accordingly de-
fined as:
pˆ(pL, pC , pR, n) =
VL(pL, pC , pR)
n
VL(pL, pC , pR)n + VC(pL, pC , pR)n + VR(pL, pC , pR)n
× pL
+
VC(pL, pC , pR)
n
VL(pL, pC , pR)n + VC(pL, pC , pR)n + VR(pL, pC , pR)n
× pC
+
VR(pL, pC , pR)
n
VL(pL, pC , pR)n + VC(pL, pC , pR)n + VR(pL, pR)n
× pR
The following result holds:8
Proposition 3. Let pii ∼ U [0, 1]. Then, (i) there exists a unique equilibrium (p∗∗∗L , p∗∗∗C , p∗∗∗R ) =
(1
2
− 1
n+1
, 1
2
, 1
2
+ 1
n+1
) and (ii) the distance between p∗∗∗R and p
∗∗∗
L is decreasing in n (iii)
pˆ = p¯i = 0.5.
8Without providing a formal definition of voters’ strategies, it is necessary to mention
that each voter i supports the party j that proposes the closest platform to his ideal
policy. If a voter is indifferent between two or even three platforms, then he votes for any
of his top-ranked parties with equal probability.
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The centrist party proposes a platform equal to its ideal policy (p∗∗∗C = piC = 0.5). The
two other parties differentiate and propose more extreme platforms. The extent to which
parties differentiate depends on the level of disproportionality (see Figure 3, which depicts
the proposed platforms (p∗∗∗L , p
∗∗∗
R ) for different values of electoral disproportionality n ∈
[1, 20]). The more proportional the electoral system is, the higher are the centrifugal
forces, and hence, polarization increases. Clearly, if parties compete in a winner-takes-all
election (n→∞), the platforms of the two peripheral parties asymptotically converge to
the median (that is, (p∗∗∗L , p
∗∗∗
C , p
∗∗∗
R )→ (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)).9
Notice that in all results presented above, including the one allowing for an asymmetric
distribution of voters, the implemented policy coincides with that of the median voter.
This implies that the citizens’ welfare is independent of the precise value of n. Here,
we would like to stress that this invariance of social welfare to electoral changes is only
apparent and a consequence of our choice to interpret our model as a parliamentary-mean
model where the implemented policy is a convex combination of the proposed platforms.
If, alternatively, one chooses to interpret our model as a dominant-party model (Faravelli
and Sanchez-Pages 2014; Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2013; Merrill and Adams 2007) – by
interpreting parties’ seat shares as the probabilities that each party can implement its
proposed platform – then, conditional on parties being risk neutral, the equilibrium results
presented in Propositions 2 and 3 remain unaffected. Now it becomes clear that even if
the expected policy outcome is still invariant in n, the variance of the policy outcome
is decreasing in n (both in two- and three-party elections), and hence, social welfare is
increasing in n. As a result, a welfare analysis of this interpretation of our model shows
that if voters are risk-averse and care both about the implemented policy (in expectation)
and its variance, they are better off under disproportional electoral systems.
9The qualitative implications of the above proposition directly extend to other distri-
butions and are not restricted to the uniform case.
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Measures of Polarization
Having characterized the equilibrium under different theoretical specifications and having
made clear the interaction of the centripetal and the centrifugal forces of the political
environment, we now turn attention to the concept of polarization. We will not argue
for or against any definition of polarization. We merely utilize our theoretical findings
in order to illustrate the importance of the choice of a given polarization measure in
empirical studies.
The empirical literature (Table A1) has mainly considered two measures of polar-
ization. The first is one that we have used so far in our theoretical analysis, where
polarization is defined as the distance between the two MDP. The second measure of
polarization is the DI, formally defined as follows:
DI =
√√√√∑
j
Vj
(
pj − p¯
0.5
)2
where p¯ denotes the weighted mean of parties’ proposed platforms (each party j is
weighted by its vote share Vj), pj is the platform proposed by party j, and the dif-
ference between the two is normalized by the mid-point ideology position, which in our
model is 0.5. The index takes value zero when all parties converge to a single position
and one when parties are equally split between the two most extreme positions.
Figure 3 summarizes our theoretical findings. On the left we plot the results presented
in Propositions 1 and 3 and as one can see the following relationship holds:
Remark 1. Polarization (measured by the MDP) in a three-party election is larger than
in a two-party election (p∗∗∗R − p∗∗∗L ≥ p∗∗R − p∗∗L with the equality holding for n = 1).
First, notice that polarization (measured by the MDP) is clearly decreasing in the
level of disproportionality both in two- and three-party elections. Second, the centrifugal
force identified in the proportionality of the electoral system is amplified as the number
of competing parties increases from two to three. The presence of a third party makes
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Figure 3: Left: The effect of electoral disproportionality n ∈ [1, 20] on proposed plat-
forms for two- (p∗∗L , p
∗∗
R ) and three-party competition (p
∗∗∗
L , p
∗∗∗
R , p
∗∗∗
C ), as characterized in
Propositions 1 and 3. Right: Polarization measured by the DI in the case of two- and
three-party elections for n ∈ [1, 20].
competition for centrist voters tougher, and hence, parties have fewer incentives to mod-
erate their policies in return for a slightly larger share of moderate votes. Moreover, when
there is no third party, as the left-wing party (for instance) diverges from the center of
the voter distribution, it loses votes (and seats) to its right-wing rival, thereby pulling
the parliamentary mean sharply to the right. By contrast, when a centrist third party
is present, policy divergence by the left-wing party causes it to lose votes (and seats) to
the centrist party, not the right-wing party as in the two-party case. In this instance,
transferring seats to the centrist party does not pull the parliamentary mean as sharply
to the right as does transferring seats to the right-wing party. So, in line with the results
by Adams and Merrill (2006), the presence of the centrist party partially “insulates”
the peripheral parties from the policy consequences of losing votes due to taking more
extreme positions.10
From a comparative perspective, the distance between the MDP in the unique equi-
10We are grateful to a referee for recommending the above interpretation.
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librium of the three-party election is larger than in the two-party election (for any n > 1,
it holds that p∗∗∗L < p
∗∗
L and that p
∗∗∗
R > p
∗∗
R ). As far as the DI is concerned, notice first
that similar to the MDP, the DI is also decreasing in the level of disproportionality both
in two- and three-party elections. Nevertheless, given that the DI is affected by parties’
vote shares, the relationship between polarization (measured by the DI) and the number
of parties for a given level of disproportionality is no longer straightforward (see Figure
3).
Remark 2. Polarization (measured by the DI) in a three-party election is larger (smaller)
than in a two-party election when n is large (small).
When n is small, the DI for the two-party election takes high values, given that
each party proposes an extreme policy platform and that each obtains half of the votes.
For the same small values of n, the DI in the three-party election is smaller than the
DI of the two-party election because of the presence of the centrist party. Given the
low levels of disproportionality (i.e., small n), the centrist party actually obtains a large
vote share that drives the DI of the three-party election to low levels. As n increases,
though, the leftist and rightist parties’ platforms become more moderate. This makes
the vote share of the centrist party – and thus, the influence of the centrist party on the
level of polarization (measured by the DI) – decrease and essentially disappear (when
n takes very large values). Hence, when n is large, the DI should eventually converge
to the MDP. From this second remark, the effect of the number of parties on the DI is
conditional on the level of disproportionality. Nevertheless, this result is proven only for
the comparison of two- and three-party models. The effect of the number of parties on
the DI is inconclusive when we extend our model to include more than three parties. As
a result, no testable predictions can be stated.
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Empirical Analysis
In line with our theoretical analysis, we state the following two hypotheses regarding the
determinants of platform polarization.
(H1) Electoral System Hypothesis (Propositions 1 and 2): Platform polariza-
tion (measured either by the DI or the MDP index) is decreasing in the disproportionality
of the electoral rule n.11
(H2) Number of Parties Hypothesis (Remark 1): Platform polarization (mea-
sured by the MDP index) is increasing in the number of competing parties.
Both hypotheses have been explored by a number of related studies yielding inconclu-
sive empirical findings (see Table A1 in the online appendix). While several approaches
fail to garner enough support for H1 (e.g., Budge and McDonald 2006; Dalton 2008;
Ezrow 2008), others provide (conditional) evidence in favor of either H1 (e.g., Calvo and
Hellwig 2011; Dow 2011) or H2 (Andrews and Money 2009). Curini and Hino (2012)
find support for two additional institutional hypotheses – the cabinet-parties conditional
hypothesis and the electoral spill-over hypothesis – while Calvo and Hellwig (2011) find
conditional support for H1 for the large governing parties.12
11Notice that the theoretical model points at a non-linear relationship between the elec-
toral rule disproportionality and platform polarization. While in the empirical analysis
we follow the literature by employing linear regression models, the non-linearity of the
disproportionality on polarization is captured in the robustness checks when the inde-
pendent variable capturing the disproportionality of the electoral rule is the log average
district magnitude. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of logn rather than n as
an independent variable.
12We also include the variables introduced by Curini and Hino (2012) as additional
controls in our regressions, but we do not find significant support for the electoral spill-
over hypothesis. Some specifications provide partial support regarding the cabinet-parties
conditional hypothesis. Nevertheless, Curini and Hino (2012) also test a simpler version
of their model that includes only H1 and H2 and is therefore directly comparable to our
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Our empirical analysis shows that the main reason why several existing studies find
weak (or even no) support for the electoral-system hypothesis is that most of them utilize
small and unbalanced data sets over a short time frame (see Table A1). As a result, most
of these studies lack enough observations of electoral rule transitions per country to
estimate the within-country effect of disproportionality on polarization. On top of it, by
including very few observations for each country – in many instances only one – even
the cross-country effects, that several of those papers are in fact estimating, are based
on a single observation per country. That is, they take into account only a snapshot
of cross-country polarization levels, making it impossible to disentangle the variation in
polarization that is related to electoral rules from country-specific trends or other intrinsic
characteristics (e.g., time or country-specific shocks that might have occurred during this
limited period of observation). Therefore, by considering a large and balanced panel,
with an average of 13 observations for each country, our work is an improvement on
both fronts: Not only do we introduce some within-country variation in the electoral rule
disproportionality, but we also improve significantly the cross-country comparison, thus
obtaining a more accurate picture of the effects of interest.
model presented in columns 1 through 3 in Table 1. The fact that we find a statistically
significant effect of disproportionality on polarization (when we estimate their model using
our data) while they do not is, therefore, clear evidence that our different predictions
cannot be attributed to these two additional hypotheses.
Calvo and Hellwig (2011) follow a different empirical approach and predict that the
disproportionality of the electoral rule acts as a centripetal force only for dominant parties,
while it is a centrifugal force for smaller ones that are predicted to occupy more extreme
positions. We, on the other hand, predict unconditional support for H1, irrespective of
party size.
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Data Description and Measurement
We combine three different sources to construct a balanced panel that combines electoral,
political, institutional, socioeconomic, and demographic data for more than 300 elections
from 23 OECD countries during the period from 1960 to 2006 (Armingeon, Potolidis,
Gerber, and Leimgruber 2010; Carey and Hix 2011; Volkens, Lacewell, Lehmann, Regel,
Schultze, and Werner 2012).13 We describe our data and main variables in this section
and provide the summary statistics in Table A2 of the online appendix.
The Dependent Variable: Our dependent variable, platform polarization, is con-
structed using data from the Volkens, Lacewell, Lehmann, Regel, Schultze, and Werner
(2012) Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset compiled by the Berlin Centre for
Social Research (WZB). The latter records the positions of the platforms proposed by
hundreds of political parties, dating back to 1946, in a unidimensional ideology (left-right)
space.14
13The 23 countries included in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and
the USA. In the specifications where we use the data of Carey and Hix (2011) our sample
consists of 21 countries (data on Iceland and Luxembourg are missing).
14Obviously, the CMP does not provide data for all parties competing in the election.
The parties in our sample represent on average 96% of votes cast, with no important
differences across electoral systems. The CMP also records parties not obtaining repre-
sentation in parliament. The vote shares of the latter range from the very low 0.77% of
the Social Credit Party in Canada (1968), 0.56% and 0.76% (in 2002 and 2008) of the
Communist Party of Austria, 1.5% of the leftist Democratic Labor Party of Australia
in 1974, 1975 and 1977, 2-3% of the UK Independence Party to the more than 5% of
the Australian Democrats and the Social Credit party in New Zealand to the staggering
12% of the Front Nationale (FN) in the 2002 French election. This information on the
political platforms of various small parties, even in countries with majoritarian electoral
24
In order to maintain consistency with our theoretical model, as well as with existing
literature, we measure polarization in two different ways. First, we consider polarization
to be the distance between the two MDP (e.g., Andrews and Money 2009; Budge and
McDonald 2006). Second, following Dalton (2008), we formally define the DI of platform
polarization for country i, in election year t exactly as previously presented, substituting
the platform proposed by party j, pj, with the ideological (platform) position of that
party in election year t at country i, weighted by the party’s vote share. Both measures
of polarization are standardized and take values from zero to ten.15 We present our
estimates using both measures and show that our main results are consistent with the
findings of our theory and the two hypotheses outlined above.
The Main Explanatory Variables: Our key explanatory variable is the measure of the
electoral rule disproportionality (parameter n) as defined in our theoretical section. By
combining data from two different sources (Armingeon, Potolidis, Gerber, and Leimgru-
ber 2010; Carey and Hix 2011) we estimate the disproportionality parameter n for 21
countries in our sample by applying the formula proposed by Taagepera (1986):
n = [log(V )/log(S)](1/M)
where V is the total number of voters, S is the total number of parliamentary seats,
and M is the average electoral district magnitude. Estimating the disproportionality
rules, implies that finding higher levels of polarization (at least as measured by the DI) in
countries that apply more proportional rules cannot be an artifact of the data collection
process.
15In our theoretical discussion the DI takes a value from zero to one since vote shares
have been defined in this interval. In our empirical analysis, vote shares are given by
percentages, and the DI simply takes values from zero to ten. Curini and Hino (2012)
also use the DI, while Dow (2011) and Ezrow (2008) use a very close analogue that
incorporates all parties’ positions weighted by their vote shares.
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parameter n allows for a tight fit between our model’s predictions and our empirical
estimation. An additional advantage of using this variable, given that the electoral rule
is a sluggish institutional variable, is that it is continuous and exhibits some within-
country variation, therefore allowing for both within- and cross-country comparisons.
Nevertheless, in order to insulate our results, we also repeat our estimates using two
alternative measures of disproportionality, both of which provide qualitatively identical
results. The first is a binary variable that takes the value of one whenever the FPTP
rule with Single-Member Districts (SMD) is applied and zero otherwise. The second is
the natural log of the average electoral district magnitude, representing the idea that a
larger district magnitude reduces the effective threshold required for a party to occupy a
parliamentary seat, and hence, making the electoral system more proportional (Taagepera
1986; Carey and Hix 2011).
The use of these three alternative measures not only increases the robustness of our
findings but also allows us to address any concerns related to limited within-country
variation and endogeneity. On one hand, the binary variable records only a radical
change from PR to a FPTP rule and vice versa. Such radical changes occurred only in
three countries (Greece, Italy and New Zealand). Since these changes are not frequent,
it is less likely that our analysis suffers from an endogeneity problem, especially since
our dependent variable varies relatively more than any of our independent ones. On
the other hand, the two continuous versions of our independent variable can partially
address the problem of limited within-country variation since both the disproportionality
parameter n and the district magnitude vary in more than half of the countries of our
sample. Importantly, under all three specifications our results are robust, statistically
significant, and identical in the direction of the effect.
Following the literature (e.g., Andrews and Money 2009; Curini and Hino 2012), we
test the number of competing parties hypothesis (H2) using the Effective Number of
Parties (ENP) index and its natural logarithm as our independent variables.16
16Laakso and Taagepera (1979) define the effective number of political parties as
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Empirical Estimation
Since empirical evidence (e.g., Gallagher 1991) and theoretical literature (e.g., Duverger
1954) suggest that electoral rules may also affect polarization through the structure of
the party system (e.g., the number of parties), in Model 1 we test our first two hypotheses
jointly in order to prevent a biased estimation (Curini and Hino 2012). This model serves
as our benchmark since most of the literature tests these two hypotheses (e.g., Andrews
and Money 2009; Curini and Hino 2012; Dalton 2008; Dow 2011; Ezrow 2008). According
to H1, we expect β1 < 0, as more disproportional rules should lead to less polarization.
17
From H2, we expect β2 > 0 when we measure polarization by the MDP index. Formally,
we estimate Model 1.a as:
POLARIZATIONit = β0 +β1×DISPROPORTIONALITYit +β2×ENPit + it (1)
Model 1.b extends Model 1.a by including year dummies (denoted by λt), whereas in
Model 2.a we also control for a set of additional institutional variables X′it – including but
not limited to those introduced by Curini and Hino (2012) – such as a coalition habits
dummy, the number of parties participating in government/cabinet and their interaction,
the type of political regime (presidentialism vs. parliamentarianism), the degree of insti-
tutional constraints, the years of consolidated democracy, a dummy variable indicating
government change, and the ideological distance between the current and previous gov-
ernment. In Model 2.b, we include country fixed effects (country dummies αi) in order
to fully exploit the structure of our data and account for country-specific characteristics.
1/
∑
j(Vj)
2. Our results are robust to controlling for the actual number of parties as
presented in the theoretical model (available upon request).
17When the log of average district magnitude is employed as our explanatory variable,
we expect β1 to be positive.
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Formally, Model 2.a is estimated as:
POLARIZATIONit = β0+β1×DISPROPORTIONALITYit+β2×ENPit+X′it×γ+λt+it
and Model 2.b as:
POLARIZATIONit = β0+β1×DISPROPORTIONALITYit+β2×ENPit+X′it×γ+λt+αi+it
We further estimate a random effects model (Model 2.c), given that our main covariate
of interest (electoral rule) either does not vary at all or exhibits small variation within
each country. In the first case, the unit-invariant independent variable (electoral rule
dummy) will be perfectly collinear with the set of country dummy variables, thus making
it impossible to estimate the unique effects of that variable (Clark and Linzer 2015).
In the latter case, our continuous independent variables change gradually over time in
most instances (particularly relative to changes in the dependent variable). However,
if“the correlation between the sluggish covariate and the unit [country] fixed effects is high
enough, this can greatly destabilize estimates of the effect of the independent variable”
(Clark and Linzer 2015). That is, the sluggish or non-varying independent variable
solves any possible endogeneity issues at the cost of rendering within-country estimates
uninformative, thus permitting only cross-country comparisons. Fortunately, random
effects are not subject to these limitations. We therefore present all of our subsequent
estimates under both specifications.
We finally estimate two additional versions of the above model: using the log of ENP
to test H2 (Model 3) and replacing the DI with the MDP (Model 4). Moreover, in the
online appendix (Table A3), we estimate variants of Models 3 and 4 using the natural
log of average electoral district magnitude as an alternative measure of the electoral rule
disproportionality (as in Carey and Hix 2011) .
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Results and Discussion
The results of estimating our main econometric model are presented in Table 1. They pro-
vide strong support for our main hypothesis (H1) regardless of how the (dis)proportionality
of the electoral rule is measured. In all specifications, more disproportionate electoral
rules are associated with lower levels of polarization. This finding is robust to various
alterations to the model, including different ways of measuring the independent variables
(see Tables 2, A3, and A4), the inclusion of more control variables (Models 2 and 3), and
random effects. Hence, our empirical analysis verifies the main theoretical prediction of
the model on the effect of electoral rule (dis)proportionality on polarization.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
Our results call for a revision of the thesis that electoral institutions have no impact
on polarization (e.g., Andrews and Money 2009; Budge and McDonald 2006; Curini and
Hino 2012; Dalton 2008; Dow 2001; Ezrow 2008) and reinforce recent work by Dow (2011)
and Calvo and Hellwig (2011) that finds some conditional support for the electoral system
(H1) hypothesis. Notice that not only is the coefficient β1 negative (as predicted) and
statistically significant, but it is also large in magnitude. Our estimates associate a
change from a PR to a FPTP rule (electoral rule becomes more majoritarian) with a two
standard deviations decrease in polarization.
The number of parties hypothesis (H2) is confirmed at the conventional levels of
significance (that is, 5% or lower) in Model 4 where polarization is measured by the
MDP index.18 The effect of the number of parties on polarization is strong (especially
when random effects are employed) and positive, as predicted. This finding is consistent
with our theoretical prediction (Remark 1) and the fact that polarization, when measured
by the MDP, is increasing in the number of competing parties. In all other specifications,
18The models where H2 is validated are presented in Table 2, where for consistency
we control for the log of ENP following Andrews and Money (2009), and in Table A3
(Models 4.c and 4.d).
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when the DI is our dependent variable,19 while the point estimate of the coefficient β2
is still positive, it is much smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant at any
conventional level (5% or lower).
Regarding the inclusion of country and year fixed effects in some econometric specifi-
cations, we note that their inclusion is not the reason that our results differ from previous
findings. This can be seen in Table 1 where the estimates obtained with a fixed effects
model (2.b) are qualitatively identical with those obtained from a model that omits coun-
try and year dummies (1.a, as for example in Curini and Hino 2012) and with those from a
model that includes the additional institutional controls (2.a). Therefore, the differences
with existing approaches should be attributed to our improved data set and estimation
techniques.
Moreover, for the reasons previously explained, we also estimated a random effects
(RE) model. Since the results we obtain using both estimators are qualitatively identical,
equally statistically significant, and consistent we conclude that these concerns have been
successfully addressed. In fact, the use of both fixed and random effects allows us to
frame the true effect of electoral rule disproportionality by estimating upper (FE) and
lower (RE) bounds.
In addition to estimating a RE model, in Table 3, we more closely examine those
countries in our sample that underwent “radical” electoral rule changes. In particular,
we consider Greece, New Zealand, and Italy. Since our FE estimates (when we use the
FPTP dummy as the dependent variable) are mainly exploiting cross-country variation,
it is instructive to examine separately those countries that are mainly responsible for
any within-country variation. In total, Greece underwent two electoral rule reforms (one
proportional and one majoritarian), New Zealand a proportional one (from FPTP with
SMD to mixed-member PR), and Italy a majoritarian one (from pure PR to a mixed
19A notable exception is Model 3.b when we estimate a random effects model while
also using the natural log of ENP in order to test H2.
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system with a majority premium).20 In total, we have four electoral rule transitions, two
proportional and two majoritarian. As shown in Table 3, in all four cases, changes in the
direction of polarization are consistent with our theory. Proportional transitions induce
an increase in mean polarization (for subsequent periods), while majoritarian ones induce
a large decrease. Moreover, despite the small sample size, all changes in polarization are
statistically significant at any conventional level and relatively large in magnitude. Thus,
our case-study analysis is in line with our previous estimates.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Overall, our empirical results yield robust support for the main prediction of the theo-
retical model on the effect of electoral rule (dis)proportionality on platform polarization.
The combination of our theoretical and empirical findings points at the electoral rule
disproportionality as a crucial institutional determinant of platform polarization.
Concluding Remarks
Our work has implications for the design of electoral institutions, as our analysis sur-
faces an interesting trade-off between the need for more democratic pluralism and wider
20The electoral rule introduced in Italy in 1993 distributed seventy five percent of the
seats according to a FPTP system and twenty five percent of the seats according to a
PR system. While all parties competed in the nationwide PR system, parties formed
pre-electoral pacts when competing under the disproportional single member districts.
That is, voters faced different choices in the nationwide district compared to the single
member one and hence different polarization levels arise for the two systems. In the
table, and in order to focus on the majoritarian transition, we compare the pre-1993
levels of polarization with the post-1993 ones in the FPTP system taking into account
any pre-electoral pacts. Interestingly, the post-1993 polarization in the PR component of
the rule (equal to 3.48) is larger than the FPTP one and not statistically different from
the pre-1993 (also PR) levels.
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political representation (served by more proportional rules) and political stability and
moderation (served by more majoritarian rules). Hence, the choice of one class of rules
over the other is not straightforward and depends on individual party-system character-
istics and the attributes of each polity.
Because this paper is a first attempt to introduce the electoral rule disproportional-
ity as modeled by Theil (1969) in a Downsian setup, several relevant questions remain
open. Assumptions regarding voters’ behavior, other than the ones presented, should
be carefully explored. A simple extension of the model suggests that our results are
robust to allowing voters to abstain. If, for instance, one considers that the society is
normally distributed around the median and that alienated voters whose ideal policies
are “sufficiently” away from the parties’ platforms abstain, then an increase in the dis-
proportionality of the electoral rule would still reduce the level of polarization.
Another important aspect of our model is that voters are expressive and support
the party that proposes the platform closest to their ideal point. But what if some
voters behave instrumentally? Intuition suggests that the presence of instrumental voters
provides further centrifugal incentives to political parties (Llavador 2006; De Sinopoli and
Iannantuoni 2007). As before, a simple extension of the model shows that our main result
would persist. That is, the degree of polarization would be higher when compared to the
case of an expressive electorate but the direction of the effect of the degree of electoral
rule disproportionality on the level of platform polarization would not be affected. But
what if, as widely accepted, the electoral system itself endogenously determines the share
of voters that behave instrumentally?
Ultimately, the extension of our multi-party model to more general setups is desirable.
Our results for the three-party case assume that the centrist party has an ideology midway
between the two extreme parties. Despite technical complexities we can claim that the
main intuitions and results regarding polarization under different levels of electoral rule
disproportionality are still valid when parties are centrist “enough” and disproportionality
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exists to a reasonable degree.21 Nevertheless, and given the importance of Duverger’s
work, further exploration of the proposed model on the interplay of electoral systems and
the number of competing parties may provide interesting insights.
21The interested reader could refer to the online appendix where we present these
results in more detail.
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TABLE 1: ELECTORAL RULE DISPROPORTIONALITY AND PLATFORM POLARIZATION IN OECD (1960-2007):  
RANDOM AND FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
 Dependent Variable Dalton Index (DI) of Platform Polarization 
  
Explanatory Variables 
 
Model 1.a 
 
 
Model 1.b 
 
Model 2.a 
Model 2.b 
Fixed Effects  
Model 2.c 
Random Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
H1 Electoral Rule Dummy (FPTP = 1)  – 0.377 – 0.471 -.- – 0.561 -.-   –  1.327 -.-  – 0.565 -.-  
  (0.148) (0.168)  (0.196)  (0.267)  (0.194)  
           
H1 Electoral Rule Disproportionality (n) -.-  -.-  – 0.156 -.- – 0.208 -.- – 0.398 -.-  – 0.200 
    (0.088)  (0.090)  (0.156)  (0.091) 
           
H2 Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 0.020 0.028 0.046 0.142 0.160 – 0.012 0.004 0.147 0.176 
  (0.069) (0.073) (0.078) (0.076) (0.092) (0.151) (0.154) (0.076) (0.093) 
           
 Random effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
           
 Country fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
           
 Year dummies ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
           
 Other institutional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes 
           
 R^2  0.04 0.18 0.18 0.31 0.30 0.42 0.41 0.31 0.30 
 Obs. (N) 307 307 255 237 237 237 237 237 237 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level reported in parentheses. Columns 1 to 3 (Models 1.a and 1.b) replicate the estimates of the econometric 
specification by Curini and Hino (2012) on our data set (with the inclusion of year dummies in all specifications from column 2 and onwards). In columns 4 
and 5 (Model 2.a) we estimate the augmented model of Curini and Hino (2012) including their additional institutional hypotheses (coalition habits and 
multiple office elections). In columns 6 and 7 (Model 2.b) we estimate a fixed effects model. In columns 8 and 9 (Model 2.c) we estimate a random effects 
model. Other institutional controls include: a (dummy) variable indicating strong coalition habits and its interaction with ENP, the number of parties 
participating in government, the type of political regime (presidentialism or parliamentarianism), the degree of institutional constraints (a categorical 
variable taking values from 0 - 6), years of consolidated democracy, a (dummy) variable indicating government change and the ideological distance 
between current and previous government. Columns 4 to 9 have fewer observations due to missing data for some institutional variables for the period from 
1960 to 1980. Column 3 has fewer observations as we cannot estimate parameter n for Iceland and Luxembourg due to missing data. 
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TABLE 2: ELECTORAL RULE DISPROPORTIONALITY AND PLATFORM POLARIZATION IN OECD (1960-2007):  
DALTON INDEX AND MOST DISTANT PLATFORMS 
 Dependent Variable Dalton Index (DI) of party-system polarization  Most Distant Platforms (MDP) Index 
  
Explanatory Variables 
Model 3.a 
Fixed Effects 
Model 3.b 
Random Effects 
Model 4.a 
Fixed Effects 
Model 4.b 
Random Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
H1 Electoral Rule Dummy (FPTP = 1)  – 1.260 -.- – 0.496 -.- – 1.922 -.- – 0.671 -.- 
  (0.287)  (0.172)  (0.337)  (0.341)  
          
H1 Electoral Rule Disproportionality (n) -.- – 0.368 -.- – 0.176 -.- – 0.626 -.- – 0.366 
   (0.164)  (0.082)  (0.178)  (0.119) 
          
H2 Log Effective Number of Parties 0.218 0.308 0.782 0.834 1.116 1.207 2.412 2.227 
  (0.654) (0.663) (0.306) (0.360) (0.590) (0.584) (0.439) (0.398) 
          
 Random effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
          
 Country fixed effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
          
 Year dummies ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
          
 Other institutional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
 R^2  0.42 0.41 0.32 0.31 0.64 0.64 0.51 0.53 
 Obs. (N) 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level reported in parentheses. Other institutional controls include: a (dummy) variable indicating strong 
coalition habits and its interaction with ENP, the number of parties participating in government, the type of political regime (presidentialism or 
parliamentarianism), the degree of institutional constraints (a categorical variable taking values from 0 - 6), years of consolidated democracy, a (dummy) 
variable indicating government change and the ideological distance between current and previous government. Missing institutional data: all countries 
from 1960 to 1980.  
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TABLE 3: ELECTORAL RULE TRANSITIONS IN GREECE (1974-2004), NEW ZEALAND (1960-2005) AND ITALY (1963-2001) 
   
Electoral Rule 
 
Transition Type 
Polarization 
(Period mean) 
 
Difference in Means 
 
Obs. (N) 
 
Election Years 
Episodes Periods       
A. GREECE       
I. Pre-1989 Reinforced PR  
Proportional 
2.22 0.91 
(0.343) 
 
4 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985 
 Post-1989 PR (D'Hondt hybrid) 3.13 3 1989a, 1989b, 1990 
        
II. Pre-1993 PR (D'Hondt hybrid)  
Majoritarian 
3.13 – 1.30 
(0.311) 
 
3 1989, 1989b, 1990 
 Post-1993 Majority Premium 1.83 4 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004 
        
B. NEW ZEALAND       
I. Pre-1994 First-Past-the-Post 
(FPTP) 
 
Proportional 
1.40 2.17 
(0.203) 
 
12 1960, -63, -66, -69, -72, -75, 
-78, -81, -84, -87, -90, -93 
 Post-1994 Mixed Member PR 3.57 4 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005 
        
C. ITALY       
I. Pre-1993 PR  
Majoritarian 
2.31 – 0.80 
(0.348) 
 
8 1963, -68, -72, -76, -79, -83, 
-87, -92 
 Post-1993 Mixed 1.51 3 1994, 1996, 2001 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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